INTRODUCTION
In Chaum (1982) first proposed the concept of blind signature. It is a particular digital signature which needs to satisfy two additional properties:
• Blindness: The signer does not see the content of the message.
• Untraceability: The signer is unable to link the message-signature pair with the corresponding view after the blind signature has been revealed to the public by the requester.
Proxy signature scheme was first presented by Mambo et al. (1996) which enables a proxy signer to sign message on behalf of an original signer. Recently, many proxy blind signatures have been proposed. A proxy blind signature is a digital signature scheme which combines the properties of proxy signature and blind signature schemes. Furthermore, it produces some new properties. So it is very useful in some special applications.
In Cai et al. (2007) , pointed out Li's et al., proxy blind signature was insecure and proposed an improved scheme which had been proved secure (Cai et al., 2007) . Hu et al. (2007) presented a new ID-based strong proxy blind signature scheme from bilinear pairings (Hu et al., 2007) . However, the author just simply claimed that the scheme met the property of untraceability and didn't give a proof. Recently, Zhang (2009) showed Cai et al. (2007) 's scheme and Hu et al. (2007) 's scheme couldn't satisfy the property of untraceability and proposed 2 corresponding improved schemes (Zhang, 2009) . Chen et al. (2010) have a research of the cryptanalysis of a new blind signature based on the DLP. Unfortunately, in this manuscript, we point out that Zhang's analysis method is improper and acquire three important conclusions.
CAI ET AL.'S SCHEME AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
Cai et al.'s scheme: Here, we will briefly recall (Cai et al., 2007) 's scheme.
Setup: Let G 1 , G 2 , be additive cyclic group and multiplicative cyclic group respectively with prime order q. A bilinear pairing : . Pick as system master key, Set Q p = sp as system public key, where, P is the generator of G 1 . 
Proxy delegation phase:
• The original signer A picks , computes:
where, m w is proxy delegation certification and then sends (U A , V A , r A , m w ) to proxy signer B.
• B checks whether the equation: Signing phase: holds, the scheme will satisfy the property of untraceability. Otherwise, it will not meet the property.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we will prove Zhang's cryptanalysis is unfortunately incorrect. Let:
be the two arbitrary message-signatures of the scheme and their corresponding views are ) , ,
respectively, so the following equations hold:
when the message-signature pair (U j , r j , V j ) is revealed to the public, the proxy signer searches all the views stored. Obviously, from its corresponding view stored, 
The proxy signer computes factors {k, p 3 } from Eq. (4) and (5): where,
Then, by use of Eq. (1) and（2), we can see that the Eq. (3) always holds: 
Our new proof method of "untraceability" analysis:
From the discussion in above section, we propose a new method of "untraceability" analysis of blind signature. The new method can be described briefly as follows:
Theorem: During the execution of the blind signature issuing protocol ∑, for the revealed message-signature pair S and any view V stored by signature (whenever they are corresponding or not), Suppose they have n corresponding "blindness" equations, the signer can compute n-1 factors from the n-1 "blindness" equations of all and then check the nth "blindness" equation by use of the given equations in the blind signature issuing protocol ∑. If the nth "blindness" equation holds, the protocol ∑ satisfies the property of "untraceability". Otherwise, it doesn't meet the property.
HU ET AL.'S SCHEME AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
Hu et al.'s scheme: Here, we will briefly recall Hu et al. (2007) 's scheme (Zhang, 2009) .
Setup: Let G 1 , G 2 be additive cyclic group and multiplicative cyclic group respectively with prime order q. A bilinear pairing : . Pick , as system master key, Set pk = xP, as system public key, where, P is the generator of 1 G . Let h, H be two hash functions where, S IDP = xH(ID P ) is the private key of proxy signer P, where H(ID p ) is the corresponding public key.
Proxy delegation phase:
• The original signer O picks , computes
sends S to proxy signer P and then publishes the parameters 
Signing phase:
• P picks 
respectively. From Hu et al. (2007) 's scheme, the following equations hold:
when the message-signature pair (U j , r j ) is revealed to the public, the proxy signer searches all the views stored. For the revealed message-signature pair (U j , r j ) and any view ) , , 
CONCLUSION
In this manuscript, we point out that Zhang's cryptanalysis method of untraceability is improper. Furthermore, we present a new analysis method of untraceability which can be used to analyze other schemes related with blind signature.
